Basile’s Renunciation: Argentina’s Saving Grace

Yes, I agree, its cliché to blame a team’s poor performances on the coach, but to be honest, in Argentina’s case, it was the coaching that caused the surprising Argentine downfall over the last few months. Alfio Basile’s recent renunciation may give the Argentine people a fresh breath of air for now, but come March, the people will need to hold their breath again in a new coaching era. With Basile gone, all problems won’t automatically be solved; however, Basile’s departure is a step in the right direction.

Basile’s number one problem was he tried to field all the best players at the same time. He made a habit of putting center backs and center midfielders in the wide positions, where they are neither comfortable nor effective. By putting players like Gabriel Heinze, a player who is better in the center than on the left, on the outside of the defense, Argentina’s attack was hindered as was their one-on-one defending. Getafe’s Cata Diaz and Newcastle’s Fabricio Coloccini are other players Basile put at left and right back respectively. In fact, due to these tactics, the majority of the goals Argentina conceded came from the wing when the opponent outnumbered Argentina in the outside positions.

In the midfield, Basile committed the same mistake with Javier Mascherano, Fernando Gago, Sebastian Battaglia, and Esteban Cambiasso, all of which are far more effective as center midfielders than wide midfielders. Argentina’s fans criticized Basile for putting three defensive midfielders out of the four midfielders on the field at the same time, often giving Leo Messi, Sergio "Kun" Aguero, Carlos Tevez, and the deeper Juan Roman Riquelme little to no support on the attack; thus, forcing them to hold on to the ball way too long, way too often. Also, Heinze and Javier Zanetti were more concentrated on covering for others than joining the attack, meaning there was very little support coming from the outsides. Argentina’s offense seemed anything but natural; in fact, it was so stagnant it looked as if Argentina would never score, a problem Argentina has never had in the past because of their abundance of offensive talent.

Argentina was often disorganized and one-sided in their attack because of an asymmetrical tactical line up. With Messi in the right forward position and no natural right midfielder behind him, it left Zanetti to play both right back and right midfield. On the left side, when Argentina did not play with a natural left-winger (like Angel Di Maria or Jonas Gutierrez)-which was very usual under Basile, Heinze was forced to do the same as Zanetti because Basile decided to place players like Cambiasso, who naturally drift centrally, in those positions. With Aguero’s recent emergence as a world class player, Basile felt forced to play Aguero, Tevez, Messi, and Riquelme. Though he noticed an abundance of similar offensive players, Basile’s solution to this problem was to field either Aguero or Tevez on the left, a position in which neither player is completely comfortable. Defensively, with Cambiasso moving to the wide left position (just behind Tevez or Aguero), the left side had plenty of cover while the right side was the opposite, as Messi’s role required the Barcelona man to stay up and not defend, leaving Zanetti exposed because Mascherano could not cover his defensive position and the right side of the pitch.

When you saw Argentina play under Basile, it looked like a free-for-all defensively, with players covering for the four forwards, and offensively, it looked more like an individual show than a collective team effort because of the lack of numbers in the offensive positions.
Argentina’s dependence on Riquelme is mostly caused by this tendency to play down the center, since their wide players were made up by central players who drifted centrally to defend and attack (and for those who do not agree with this Riquelme dependence, watch the Chile-Argentina game). Without wide midfielders, Messi and Aguero depend on Riquelme for service, but against any team that pressured and marked Riquelme closely, the opponent caused offensive confusions and problems for Argentina. This forced an overall dependence on individuals to score, set others up, and win games.

In many ways, this problem caused Argentina’s offense to become too predictable and much easier to defend than the typical free-flowing passing Argentinean team. Under Basile, Zanetti and Heinze were usually left stranded due to the over-emphasis on the center of the field. Heinze, a purely defensive player, lacks real technical ability to attack, leaving right back Zanetti, the only natural wide player, to start up attacks from wide positions while Messi roamed in and out of central and wide positions looking for the little space the opponent gave him. All of these elements piled more and more pressure on the Boca number ten, who has often been criticized as much as Basile.

Lastly, Basile’s international call-ups have been criticized over and over again, and rightfully so. Basile’s obsession with calling-up central players gave the coach very few options when he needed to have a more attack minded team with a new attack mode. In Argentina’s game against Chile, his lack of wide players on the bench forced the coach to continue the three-forward attack without any wide players offering crosses or support. Basile, in Jonas' absence, often left Di Maria, the only wide midfielder in the entire squad, on the bench. The lack of quality target men is not Basile’s fault, but in such a huge talent pool, there are plenty of wide midfielders and wide backs he could have used, a decision that often continued the one-dimensional, extremely predictable Argentinean attack.

Against Peru, Basile finally decided to use Pablo Zabaleta, a natural wide back, but he used the former Espanyol man as a central midfielder, a mistake that went on to cost Argentina in the dying seconds of the match when Peru tied with the last kick of the ball. Monzon, a quality left back, has rarely been used, though he looks more comfortable than Heinze on the left. Finally, Basile called up three domestic uncapped players, to list a couple: Bergessio and Sand, for the latest FIFA qualifying dates for the COMNEBOL, instead of calling up players like Higuain, Lavezzi, and Zarate, all of which have more international experience and are performing very well in the top leagues. Basile overemphasized the power of the Argentinean League by calling up three San Lorenzo players and one Velez player while leaving out other players with more experience. As such, Argentina suffered from lack of experience and quality.

Player effort, player fatigue, and individualism add to Argentina’s decline in form. However under Basile, Argentina was a team few fans recognized because of the lack of ‘true football’ the team produced. Add player troubles like the ones previously mentioned with Basile’s unorthodox tactics and international call-ups and the result is a world class Argentinean squad in danger of not qualifying, a problem Argentina has not encountered for some time now. There is now a new hope for Argentina; it is up to the new coach, whoever it may be, to re-organize and bring back the true Argentinean playing style, a style of great technique and an impressive work ethic.

If Argentina, with arguably the best player, Messi, best striker, Aguero, best number ten in Riquelme, and best defensive midfielder in Mascherano, were not to qualify to the South African World Cup, it would be the biggest upset since the Dutch lost the 1974 World Cup final to West Germany. To quote Messi, “Under Basile, we had no idea what we were doing on the pitch”, and this was very clear over the last 5 or 6 qualifying matches.